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Trade Union Trade-Offs: Unions, Voters,
and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism
Kim Gabbitas
The University of Utah

Abstract
Trade union membership in European Union member states has been in decline for
decades, which has many concerned about the future of workers’ rights. While existing
work examines the reasons for this decline, my research shifts the focus from union density
to the functions unions serve and how these functions affect and are affected by changing
electoral behavior. I examine the rise of right-wing populist movements in Europe and how
these movements and the challenges today’s labor unions face can be traced to the same underlying forces. I argue that, as the relevance of trade unions declines for blue-collar workers, support for right-wing movements increases. I test this claim with the help of statistical
analyses of European Values Study data. I find preliminary support for my hypothesis, and
suggest how this can inform our responses to the rise of populism in Europe.
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In recent years, the rise of radical right-wing populist movements throughout the
European Union has been observed by a wide variety of social scientists and journalists.
While this rise has been significant since the 1990s in some areas, the success of the Leave
campaign in the United Kingdom (UK) and the election of Donald Trump in the United
States (US) have brought these movements into the forefront of the greater political dialogue. A variety of explanations have been fielded for the increasing popularity of these
movements, but none adequately explain the electoral behavior of the working class. In
this paper, I present an alternative explanation: as trade unions increasingly fail to engage
a changing working class, low-wage and blue collar workers turn to populist movements
touting anti-establishment and anti-globalization rhetoric.
I examine the relationship between the declining strength of labor unions and the
rise of radical right-wing populist movements, and use that analysis to understand how the
same underlying forces cause both. I then present suggestions for how the European Union
can use this understanding to inform the responses to illiberal, Eurosceptic movements
while simultaneously addressing the legitimate concerns of the working class.
The Rise of Populism
Founded in 1972, the French National Front party was nothing more than a fringe
movement with virtually zero electoral success for the first decade of its existence. Under
Jean-Marie Le Pen, however, these right-wing radicals gained 9.6 percent of the vote in
1988 and more than 14 percent in French presidential elections. Similarly, the Swedish
radical right-wing Autopartei (literally “Automobile Party”) went from two seats in parliament to 10 in just four years between 1987 and 1991. Similar radical right populist parties
like Vlaams Blok and Ny Demokrati emerged from virtual unrecognition to relative electoral success across Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Betz, 1994). While populist movements
vary greatly by geography, they usually share common ultra-nationalist, Eurosceptic, and
anti-globalization themes. Jens Rydgren (2005) theorizes that extreme right-wing populist parties are part of a family of ideologies, supported by and learning from one another.
However, these radical right-wing parties often don’t match traditional right-wing beliefs
in every way.
Consider the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). M5S is one of the most distinctive populist movements currently facing Europe because it strives to remain above either
the right or the left, instead seeking an anti-party agenda. While many movements have
found a wider audience for their ideas through the internet, M5S considers it its genesis.
For M5S, the internet is “a medium remorselessly eliminating mediation of all kinds that
will eventually destroy parties and make possible a form of direct democracy if the people
control the government through constant voting over the web (The Economist, 2016).”
Some have called this strategy unrealistic, even Messianic in its idealism, but M5S can give
us great guidance in understanding how these populist movements grow into disruptive
electoral factions. By repeatedly telling the story of hyper-partisanship ruining the function
of government and the establishment using these functions to their own gain, an aggressively anti-system rhetoric can be largely void of tangible policy and still attract a high
volume of voters.
In June of 2016, the United Kingdom shocked the world when a referendum to
leave the European Union passed despite the advice of former prime ministers, business
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/8
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and financial leaders, and despite polls predicting the opposite. Markets, media, and even
pro-Brexit voters were shocked by the move, the first major populist upset of the year. The
primary question of the aftermath was how this movement, which had been dismissed as
far-fetched and foolish in the 1990s, gained so much support so quickly. The Financial Times
suggests four ingredients which caused the change: dissatisfaction with the elite, the ubiquitous urban/rural divide, immigration conflicts, and a perceived loss of control. The Vote
Leave campaign harnessed voters with these concerns by peddling an anti-immigration
message focused on the inability of the political elites, like former Prime Minister David
Cameron, to lead change. By advertising Brexit as the move that would finally set the
UK free from the elites and the bureaucracy, the Leave campaign came out the other side
stronger, louder, and smarter than the Remain campaign.
As Michael Broenig (2017) suggests, populist movements have gained strength
in Europe partially due to the convergence of the mainstream center-left and center-right
parties, which has left those outside the center without mainstream leaders or representation. Disenfranchised, often working class voters turn to the rising populist movements who
promise a refuge from the mainstream ‘establishment’ or ‘elite.’ This also manifests in antidemocratic sentiments, as noted by scholars such as Robert Foa and Yascha Mounk (2016)
who examined a World Values Survey wave published in 2016 and found that support for
authoritarian forms of government is on the rise, while support for democratic institutions is
declining, especially among the younger generations. Social and electoral support for radical
right-wing populist movements across the western world is on the rise.
While it may be tempting to assume this trend will dwindle in favor of the traditional centrist parties and institutions that have defined the western world for the last
century, there is a danger to this: the election of Donald Trump shows that even the most
stable democracies can be susceptible to these anti-establishment movements. If we follow
this trend to its logical end, there is a very real risk that the same liberal institutions we rely
on for protection of human rights, basic environmental policy, and even conflict resolution
will become obsolete to the detriment of people and societies worldwide. Trade, human
migration, and international cooperation all risk major setbacks from which it could take
decades to recover.
The Decline of Trade Unions
Trade union membership has been on the decline across western countries for
the last three decades, in many areas falling to record lows, as reported by the International
Labour Organization (2015). Many have long assumed that labor unions are inevitably
going to become extinct; unless trade unions substantially shift their focus towards new and
emerging demographics within the labor force and reevaluate their relationships with government entities, they may indeed. Union leaders have oft conceded these challenges. As
the president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL–CIO) said in 2013; “[O]ur still-struggling economy, weak laws and political as well
as ideological assaults have taken a toll on union membership, and in the process, have also
imperiled economic security and good, middle-class jobs” (Trumka, 2013).
European trade union leaders are responding with more optimism to the similar
situation they face. Brendan Barber, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, said:
Trade Union Trade-Offs
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Today’s relatively small fall in the number of union members is actually a union
success story, given the continuing decline in traditionally unionized jobs in sectors such as manufacturing. Indeed, after falling strongly through the 1980s and
early 1990s, union membership has roughly stabilized since 1997 … economic
changes mean that unions have to run hard just to keep still. (Waddington, 2005)
Increased trade and rapid globalization has left the unskilled working class feeling
victimized by lower wages and the uncertain futures of their jobs in manufacturing and
industry, and the labor movement has failed to keep up with their changing concerns.
Furthermore, trade unions have yet to design a successful method of organizing low-wage
service workers, the still-growing largest sector of low-wage labor. Existing research focuses
on three central explanations for this trend: macroeconomic conditions (sometimes called
the ‘business cycle’ explanation), the changing composition of the labor force, and increasing legislative barriers. To understand the relationship between the decline of trade unions
and the rise of populism, I will consider each of these explanations briefly, leaving further
debate regarding the reasons for continuing trade union decline to future research.
Using macroeconomic trends to understand changes in union density is an overall
rather successful approach. This model shows that, in the short run, union density is related
positively to changes in employment and price inflation and negatively to unemployment
and wage inflation. Furthermore, in the long run, union density is negatively related to
real wage growth (Disney, 1990). Union membership is also closely tied to the number of
employees in a business (measured as average firm size), such that union density is strongest
with large firm sizes and low unemployment—signs of a strong economy—and weakest
when unemployment is high and firm sizes are small. This model therefore suggests that we
cannot expect to see union density increase substantially until real wages and employment
are also increasing.
The most popular and most widely accepted and cited explanation for the decline
of labor unions is the changing composition of the labor force both from demanders and
suppliers of labor. In virtually every developed country, we can observe the economic shift
from manufacturing and industry to service economies and white-collar labor. For labor
unions seeking new members, workers in a service economy (what we might traditionally
call ‘white-collar’) can be prohibitively difficult to organize. Less homogenous preferences
and the lack of a historically organized community among these workers are factors, as is
the transient relationship between workers and employers, which is caused by the growing
trend of flexibility and individualism in the workplace. Indeed, a paper from the European
Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety claims:
Employment is shifting from industry, where unionization rates tend to be
relatively high, to private sector services, where unionization rates are lower.
Associated with this shift are the growth of atypical forms of employment,
employment at small workplaces and new forms of employment relationship.
Trade union movements have yet to adjust to these developments with the consequence that members are being lost from industry at a higher rate than they are
being recruited in private sector services. (Schnabel, 2012)
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/8
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As workers become more likely to work short-term jobs and change jobs frequently, workplace culture has shifted toward growing emphasis on the individual relationships between employees and employers, which draws workers away from the sense of
community that is so important to union recruitment techniques. The lower unionization
rates of this new workforce have contributed substantially to decreasing density.
Public opinion has changed as well, and unions are seen more and more negatively
in the western world. In a collection of surveys conducted by Gallup in the United States,
workers point to concerns about corruption and greed within labor unions. Overall, public
opinion of labor unions has decreased significantly since its high point in 1955. Currently,
only 56% of people in the US have a favorable view of labor unions (Gallup, 2016). The
same polls also suggest that more people think labor unions are unnecessary thanks to the
gains already made in labor rights.
Structural changes in domestic industrial relations have made unions increasingly
less relevant to the average worker. The difference in wages between unionized and nonunionized workers has shrunk substantially, leading the costs of union membership to outweigh the benefits. Employment law has also increasingly favored the militantly anti-union
stance of employers recently, and right-to-work laws, which have inhibited union access to
the workplace, make it increasingly difficult to recruit new members. Using a simple linear
regression analysis to explore the long-term effects of changes in legal regulations, Freeman
and Pelletier (1990) find that more recent legislation has been a major driver of decline in
union membership. These authors also find a major difference in membership in workplaces where unions are recognized versus those where unions have not gained recognition,
showing that the attitudes of management toward trade unions is also a major determinant
of the strength and density of unions (Freeman & Pelletier, 1990).
Similarly, states that follow the Ghent system, in which unemployment insurance
is distributed by trade unions, see significantly higher rates of union density as compared
to non-Ghent states. But even where unions play a vital legal function, membership is still
affected by the other variables discussed here. However, even these systems are eroding in
favor of more centralized welfare systems (Böckerman, 2005).
Where Trade Unions and Populism Intersect
The rise of globalization has substantially changed the interest of the working class.
Regions rich in capital continue to see significant decreases in jobs and slowing growth
in the manufacturing and industry sectors due to the significantly cheaper labor markets
elsewhere and the automation of many unskilled jobs. These displaced workers, in need
of secure employment, must either enter further occupational training and education programs or must accept significantly lower wages and competition from migrant workers,
automation, and off-shoring for their jobs. Thus, it is reasonable for the unskilled working
class to move to the right, towards protectionist trade policy, anti-immigration stances,
and a general distrust of democratic institutions, or ‘the establishment,’ which are benefiting from the cheaper labor markets available outside of capital rich regions. Unfortunately
for trade unions and other democratic institutions, their commitment to the liberal ideals
attractive to skilled workers, skilled laborers, or working professionals are no longer attractive to the unskilled, low-wage sectors of the working class.
As labor unions increasingly represent these groups who aren’t as threatened by
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factors like globalization and immigration—groups which may in fact benefit from them in
the long run—they are accordingly maintaining left-leaning policies. Unions throughout
North America and Europe have released statements on the importance of assisting refugees in workplace integration and on the benefits of globalization and increased trade. As
trade union density decreases over time and membership shifts toward professionals and
skilled workers, the low-wage earning working class, which is more likely to perceive a
threat from increased trade and immigration, does not have the traditional advocate they
had during the early decades of the labor movement. They therefore seek representation
in emerging populist movements which tout antiestablishment, ultranationalist ideals. The
rise of radical right populist movements in North America and Europe provides an opportunity for massive swaths of the working class who feel their interests are not represented
by trade unions to find leaders who propose increasing barriers to human migration, heavily
penalizing outsourcing of jobs and businesses through high tariffs, and a return to domestic
manufacturing and industry as solutions to the specter of a highly-educated workforce and
service based economy. What emerges is a struggle between the liberal trade unions and the
radical right wing populists for control of the working class voting bloc.
If this trend can be demonstrated, it means there is a clear shortfall in our current
institutions: the ideals of liberal democracy do not fully represent a working class which is
becoming less and less satisfied with the organizations meant to guarantee their interests.
Research Design
To test my theory, I analyze the relationships between public opinion related to
labor unions and political parties, including union membership and other variables. I restrict
my analysis to data from the European Values Study, because it is sufficiently uniform and
reliable. The European Values Study (hereafter called “EVS”) data comes from waves 1
thru 4, between 1981 and 2008. These results include nearly 165,000 unique observations
in 48 countries1. Questions are translated and altered for best fit in each geographic region
(e.g. confidence in the European Union is not measured in the United States), and all waves
use a universe which includes the adult population of a country, ages 18 and older2. This
survey used representative multi-stage or stratified random sampling throughout and was
conducted through face-to-face interviews. The relevant survey questions are: whether the
respondent belongs to a trade union, the level of confidence in trade unions, and where the
respondent places her- or himself on the political scale from left to right, with 1 being the
furthest left and 10 being the furthest right (see Table 1). I use IBM’s SPSS Statistics 24 for
my analysis.
1 Albania (AL); Armenia (AM); Austria (AT); Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA); Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); Belarus (BY); Canada (CA); Switzerland (CH); Cyprus (CY); Cyprus (CY), Turkish Cypriot Community ; Czech
Republic (CZ); Germany (DE); Denmark (DK); Estonia (EE); Spain (ES); Finland (FI); France (FR); Great Britain
(GB-GBN); Northern Ireland (GB-NIR); Georgia (GE); Greece (GR); Croatia (HR); Hungary (HU); Ireland
(IE); Iceland (IS); Italy (IT); Lithuania (LT); Luxembourg (LU); Latvia (LV); Moldova, Republic of (MD); Montenegro (ME); Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of (MK); Malta (MT); Netherlands (NL); Norway (NO);
Poland (PL); Portugal (PT); Romania (RO); Serbia (RS); Kosovo-Metohija (RS-KM); Russian Federation (RU);
Sweden (SE); Slovenia (SI); Slovakia (SK); Turkey (TR); Ukraine (UA); United States (US).
2 Excludes Wave 4, in which observations from Finland include adults ages 18 thru 74, and observations from
Armenia include those 15 years and older.

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/8
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Table 1
EVS Longitudinal Data File
1981-2008

EVS1981

EVS1990

EVS1999

EVS2008

S Archive/ID Variables and Interview Characteristics

a067

Member:
Belong
to labour
unions

v121

q134a

v15

v13

e033

Self positioning in
political
scale

v458

q478

v185

v193

e069_05

Confidence:
v543
q550f
v204
v209
Labour
Unions
EVS Variable Descriptions with Variable Codes. Adapted from “EVS 1981-2008 Variable
Report Longitudinal Data Files.” European Values Study and GESIS Data Archive for the
Social Sciences; 2015.
If the null hypothesis is correct, there will be no difference between union members and non-union members. To display the difference which I believe exists, I create
contingency tables for each EVS wave using variables a067 and e033, and variables e069_05
and e033. If my hypothesis is correct, I should find that union members are increasingly
more likely to place themselves on the right side of the political scale over time, though
they should still be much less likely than non-union members to identify with the far
right. Analysis should also show that those with high confidence in labor unions (variable
e069_05) are more likely to position themselves to the left of the political spectrum, while
those with low confidence are more likely to position themselves to the right. These differences should remain constant over time; however, the full sample should show a shift
to the right.
To further test the relationships between these variables, I attempt an ordinal regression analysis. I use the same variables from the EVS Longitudinal dataset, but recode the data
to be conducive to an ordinal regression analysis by creating a series of dummy variables
for each of the two independent variables, such that: confidence_1 is E069_05=Missing,
Unknown; confidence_2 is E069_05=No answer; confidence_3 is E069_05=Don´t know;
confidence_4 is E069_05=A great deal; confidence_5 is E069_05=Quite a lot; confidence_6 is E069_05=Not very much; confidence_7 is E069_05=None at all; and so forth,
using the same logic for the membership variable.
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Findings and Analysis
My analysis of data gathered by the European Values Study between 1981 and
2008 shows preliminary support for my theory. A comparison of contingency tables from
each EVS wave between 1981 and 2008 showed that union members were less likely than
non-union members to place themselves on the right end of the political spectrum until
2008 (see Table 2). However, the proportion of union members who placed themselves
on the right end of the political spectrum increased much more quickly than that of nonunion members. Indeed, the number nearly doubled between the third and fourth waves
(see Figure 1).
Table 2
Wave

Membership: yes

Membership: no

Sample

EVS1981

6.33%

8.93%

8.39%

EVS1990

5.31%

7.67%

7.15%

EVS1999

5.45%

8.14%

7.68%

EVS2008
10.47%
8.22%
8.4%
Far-Right Identity Over Time. Table 2 shows the percentage of respondents who position
themselves 9-10 on the political scale from left to right, with 1 being the furthest left and
10 being the furthest right. Adapted from EVS (2015): European Values Study Longitudinal
Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file
Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253.

Figure 1. Right-Wing Identity Among Union Members. Figure 1 is the graphical representation of the data displayed in Table 2. Adapted from EVS (2015): European Values
Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne.
ZA4804 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253
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These data suggest that labor union members are increasingly identifying with the
far right of the political spectrum, contrary to historical norms. Furthermore, the spike in
union members placing themselves at 9 or 10 on the spectrum between 1999 and 2008
may be indicative of the growing popularity of right-wing populist movements. Analysis
of EVS2017, which will begin in August of 2017, may provide additional evidence of this
trend. Additional research into the rates of membership decline and the rates of increasing
right-wing identity could also help better describe these changes.
Analysis of respondents stratified by their level of confidence in labor unions shows
that those with high confidence are more likely to position themselves to the left on the
political spectrum (1 or 2), while those with low confidence are more likely to position
themselves to the right (9 or 10). These differences remain constant over time and display
a measurable shift toward the far-left and -right ends of the spectrum, supporting the idea
that voters overall are more likely to identify with radical political movements than with
the moderate or centrist ruling parties.

Figure 2. Left-Wing Identity by Union Confidence. Displays changes in the proportion of respondents who identify as a 1 or 2 on the political spectrum, stratified by level of confidence in labor unions. Adapted from EVS (2015): European
Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS
Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.1225
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Figure 3. Right-Wing Identity by Union Confidence. Displays changes in the proportion of
respondents who identify as a 9 or 10 on the political spectrum, stratified by level of confidence in labor unions. Adapted from EVS (2015): European Values Study Longitudinal
Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file
Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253
As displayed in Figure 2, those with very high confidence in labor unions are the
most likely to identify as either a 1 or 2, or far-left, on the political spectrum. Likewise,
those with extremely low confidence are the most likely to identify as either a 9 or 10, or
the far-right (see Figure 3). This finding suggests that as confidence in labor unions declines
over time, total right-wing identity increases over time, supporting the theory that individuals losing confidence in labor unions may instead be placing that confidence in rightwing populist movements.
Based on the figures displayed above and the parameter estimates observed in
Table 3a, we can assume there is a relationship between both membership in a labor union
and level of confidence in labor unions and political identity. Using a logistic regression
means we are testing the probabilities associated with observing certain responses. Thus, our
model is:

where the coefficients in our regression output tell us how much the logit, or probability of
a specific value in the dependent variable, changes based on the values of our independent
variables. The sign of the coefficient tells us if each independent variable correlates with a
higher or lower dependent variable value.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/8
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Table 3a

PLUM Ordinal Regression
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Observing Table 3b below, we can reject the null hypothesis that a model without
our independent variables is as good as a model with the independent variables. However,
this doesn’t mean we can assume the model is a perfect fit. Observing Table 3c, we can see
that the chi-square values are exceptionally large and our significance remains at the .000
output. This suggests that our model does not fit the data in question. A model that fits
properly should show a small chi-square value and a high significance level.
Table 3b
Model Fitting Information
-2 Log
Likelihood

Model
Intercept
Only

3881.866

Final

1497.418

ChiSquare

df

2384.448

Sig.

8

.000

Model Fitting Information
Link function: Logit.
Table 3c
Goodness-of-Fit
Chi-Square

df

Sig.

Pearson

917.509

55

.000

Deviance

917.231

55

.000

Goodness-of-Fit Output
Link function: Logit.
While there are certain transformations of data and variations of models that could
provide a better fit for our data, outlined below, the output we can observe suggests that
decreasing confidence in labor unions increases the probability of selecting a higher value
on the political identity scale. In other words, the lower one’s confidence in labor unions,
the more likely one is to identify with right-wing political ideologies. Furthermore, having
“a great deal” of confidence in labor unions (confidence_4) indicates a higher likelihood of
placing oneself on the left-wing of the political spectrum. Not belonging to a labor union
also increases the likelihood of a respondent selecting a higher value, or further right position, on the political spectrum.
Limitations
While the data show some support for my hypothesis, there are significant caveats to be considered in our data. First, the analysis does not control for use of the Ghent
system. Combining union density statistics in both Ghent and non-Ghent states means our
membership numbers are not fully reliable or consistent, and we instead see two distinct
sets of membership rates: one with membership in the 80% range (Ghent states), and one
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/8
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with membership clustered around 13%. Moving the analysis from the full dataset to a
much smaller scale, such as a state-level analysis, would help us to gain a better idea of how
different industrial relationships affect our hypothesis and would better control for the variations in the roles of labor unions, the unique flavors of each nationalist or radical right-wing
movement, and differing population size, resources, economies, etc.
We must also consider the model fit. Recall that the output shown in Table 3c
suggested a straightforward ordinal regression was not the best fit model. To correct this,
future research should attempt a multivariate analysis to control for time. The dataset used
here is longitudinal, covering four distinct EVS waves from 1981 to 2008. Using a generalized linear model with fixed effects could solve this problem and provide a much more reliable analysis of the relationships in question, including an analysis of these rates of change.
The EVS 2017 wave will be introduced to the field in the fall of 2017, and will provide
even more relevant information. Each of the trends I have observed has also increased its
rate of change substantially in recent years, so adding the EVS2017 data to the mix will
provide a greater range of data in which to observe these trends.
Furthermore, if we are trying to show support for the hypothesis that these two
trends share similar underlying causes, we should test those variables as well. The theoretical
causes discussed in my literature review section are the convergence of mainstream political movements, globalization manifested in increased trade and migration, and the growing
distrust of the political and economic elite. To test the degree to which these causes may
explain variation in both trends, we could run a similar analysis using variables which quantify these changes. For example, using attitudes toward trade and immigration, we could
create a “protectionist index” which could be used to determine if those holding more
protectionist ideologies are more or less likely to distrust labor unions. We could use the
same index to evaluate political identity. We could then assume that similar coefficients and
significance suggests the hypothetical “protectionist index” is indeed a factor causing both
trends and therefore the basis of the existing relationship for which we found evidence. We
could also use such measurements as occurrence of foreign direct investments or multilateral
trade agreements as measures of globalization. The same process could be followed using
indexes representative of all three theoretical causes to better understand their roles in these
trends.
Conclusion
Ultimately, more research is needed to confirm my findings, but this preliminary
analysis shows a worrying trend. As union density continues to fall, we can expect support for right-wing populist movements to grow. It is possible that falling confidence and
membership can be reversed by increasing organization efforts among white collar workers, advocating for greater interaction between government and labor unions, and allowing
labor unions greater access to the workplace. By re-engaging the working class, and therefore providing them better political and social representation, labor unions can regain the
strength of the labor movement in decades past and may be able to slow the rising distrust
in democratic institutions that has closely followed radical right-wing populist movements.
The economic concerns of blue collar workers are neither illegitimate nor inexorably tied
to the rising intolerances characteristic of radical right-wing populist movements. Rather,
it is the failure of liberal institutions like labor unions to adequately represent the economic
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concerns of the working class that is continuing to encourage these shifts. Correcting these
failures doesn’t necessitate a move to the right for labor unions. Instead, focusing on job
placement for unemployed manufacturers and occupational education for those left behind
by the shift to a service economy could bring this disenfranchised population back into the
workforce.
The shared liberal values enshrined in democratic international regimes are essential to keeping peace and human security around the world; rising support for radical right
wing populist parties across North America and Europe pose an unparalleled domestic
threat to those regimes. But these trends are not inexorable. Trade unions and other liberal
institutions can—and must—reconnect with and re-engage the working class and provide
legitimate political and social representation.
Author's Notes
This work was supported by funding from the Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program at the University of Utah awarded to Kim Gabbitas.
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